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Abstract 
  
Economic liberalisation has an impact on the economic activity of States and on the 
balance between government intervention and free markets. The old national service 
monopolies now have to be reconciled with basic EU economic freedoms. The 
introduction of new regulatory techniques requires a different kind of administrative 
body to govern utilities. National Regulatory Agencies have been set up to guarantee 
that regulation is exercised on an equal basis, without discrimination in favour of the 
incumbents from the monopoly era.  The results and achievements of liberalisation 
are to some extent dependent on the administrative context. In many cases, European 
norms stipulate particular procedures for the organisation of public administration. 
States are no longer free to implement EU legislation in accordance with the paradigm 
of institutional autonomy: independent regulatory authorities are imposed as a 
cornerstone of liberalisation. In this paper we analyse three recent examples in which 
Spain allegedly failed to fulfil its obligations as a EU member State, and contend that 
Spain’s current legislative reforms are at odds with European requirements.  
 
 
Keywords: Economic liberalisation; administrative organisation; National Regulatory 
Agencies; implementation of EU Law.  
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1. Introduction  
By virtue of European Law, State monopolies must be reconciled with the basic 
economic freedoms deriving from the European Union legislation. This spells the end 
of the economic and legal autarchy of individual States, as national economies become 
involved in the process of interdependence, industry relocation and globalisation. 
States are thus compelled to revise many of the pre-existing national regulations that 
do not conform to this liberal European framework. In addition to the elimination of 
nationality-based discrimination and the elimination of State-run monopolies, 
European Law requires the transformation of domestic legal order and does away 
with the traditional model of government intervention in the economy that is so 
prevalent in southern European countries.  
For this process to function, new administrative legislation has to be formulated in 
order to establish a legal and institutional framework. The legal order is not intended 
to create operating guidelines in a model of over-regulation and dominant public 
intervention, but rather to recreate conditions that allow more flexible, dynamic 
organisation. This neo-regulation of the public sector does not represent an 
abandonment of the intervention in individual activities, but a transformation of the 
techniques used – that is, a re-regulation. For example, the formation of a new 
                                                 
1
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Competition Law substitutes State intervention with surveillance of market operators’ 
behaviour. The idea is not to dismantle Administrative Law, but to change the 
techniques used. To attribute these changes to a desire to do away with 
Administrative Law (though possibly justified in some cases) reveals a certain 
ideological bias.  
Economic liberalisation ought also to be understood as a transformation of the legal 
instruments available for public intervention in the economy. Experts have 
emphasised the paradigm shift that Competition Law represents. Some authors have 
used this idea to consider competition policy a contemporary regulatory tool. It is a 
kind of regulation which does not dictate entrepreneurial behaviour, but in the 
majority of cases, indicates what companies should not do. More than controlling 
firms’ conduct by means of direct intervention, governments act by supervising 
respect for a more broadly defined competitive framework, the free market. 
Individuals, or businesses in this case, have a wide scope for action within the 
framework of healthy and fair competition, and are not subject to the rigid mandates 
dictated by public authorities or ministries. So governments are assigned a low profile 
in the economy, characterised by the demise of the interventionist tools they applied 
in the past, and the birth of independent bodies to oversee competition policy and the 
regulation of utilities.  
As a result, we need to analyse the new regulatory scenario that the notion “regulation 
through competition”, embodies, as well as the new administrative structures 
responsible for the implementation of the policy. The whole process of neo-
intervention requires the development of new administrative organisations termed 
National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs): in Spain, the National Energy Commission 
(CNE), the Commission for the Telecommunications' Market (CMT) and the National 
Competition Commission (CNC).2 The degree of independence of these administrative 
bodies constitutes a crucial element in isolating market regulation both from industry 
capture and political interference. 
                                                 
2 .- These three authorities are all now merged in a new macro independent regulator: the Comisión Nacional de 
los Mercados y la Competencia (the National Commission for Markets and Competition, CNMC). See ut infra.  
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In this paper we analyse three recent case studies, each of which reveals a lack of 
understanding of the transformation mentioned above. All the studies touch on the 
legal order in Spain, which is performing particularly poorly in this domain (though 
the situation may well be similar in other southern European Member States). We 
conclude with some legal implications.  
2. Recent European judgements and legal reform. The fable of the Emperor’s 
new clothes.  
2.1 The Spanish Audiovisual Authority  
The audiovisual sector is in permanent transformation. Most European countries have 
strong public broadcasters which operate in a competitive market alongside private 
channels. The audiovisual sector is a particularly sensitive one since it not only 
constitutes an important area of economic activity but is also deeply rooted in the 
protection of fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression and information.  
 In 2000, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted 
Recommendation number 23 which obliged member States to create independent 
regulators in the audiovisual in field, in the following terms:  
“Considering (...) that it is important that member States should guarantee the 
regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector genuine independence, in 
particular, through a set of rules covering all aspects of their work, and 
through measures enabling them to perform their functions effectively and 
efficiently; Recommends that the governments of member States:  
a. establish, if they have not already done so, independent regulatory 
authorities for the broadcasting sector;  
b. include provisions in their legislation and measures in their policies 
entrusting the regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector with powers 
which enable them to fulfil their missions, as prescribed by national law, in an 
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effective, independent and transparent manner, in accordance with the 
guidelines set out in the appendix to this recommendation.”3 
The wording of the Recommendation allows no room for discussion:  the regulation of 
broadcasting is to be entrusted to independent authorities. Member States have 
adopted a wide variety of institutional solutions to set up their audiovisual 
authorities, as we see from the table below:  
Country Regulator 
Austria Kommunikationsbehörde Austria (KommAustria) 
Belgium Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel de la Communauté Française 
Medienrat of the German speaking Community of Belgium 
Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media 
Bulgaria Council for Electronic Media CEM 
Cyprus Cyprus Radio-Television Authority 
Czech 
Republic 
Council for Radio and TV Broadcasting 
Denmark Radio and Television Board, c/o Media Secretariat 
Estonia Estonian Public Broadcasting Council 
Finland Viestintävirasto Kommunikationsverket (FICORA) 
France Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA) 
                                                 
3 .Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the independence and functions of 
regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector. Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 20 December 2000, 
at the 735th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. Available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/doc/cm/rec%282000%29023%26expmem_EN.asp  
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Germany Direktorenkonferenz der Landesmedienanstalten - DLM 
Greece National Council for Radio and Television 
Hungary Nemzeti Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH) 
Ireland Broadcasting Authority of Ireland - BAI 
Italia Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (Agcom) 
Latvia National Electronic Media Council 
Luxembourg Conseil National des Programmes 
Lithuania Ryšių reguliavimo tarnyba (RRT) 
Malta Malta Broadcasting Authority (MBA) 
Netherlands Commissariaat voor de Media 
Poland National Broadcasting Council - KRRiT 
Portugal Entidade Reguladora para a Comunicação Social - ERC 
Romania National Audiovisual Council - CNA 
Slovakia Rada pre vysielanie a retransmisiu 
Slovenia Post and Electronic Communication Agency of the Republic of 
Slovenia 
Spain Consejo Estatal de Medios Audiovisuales (CEMA)  
Sweden Swedish Broadcasting Authority 
United 
Kingdom 
Office for Communications (Ofcom) 
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The French Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel could be taken as a model due to its 
independence, regulatory fitness and transparency. France’s audiovisual authority 
was partially inspired by the experiences of the USA and Canada, and in the early 
1980s a public body for the control of radio and TV operators was created. The Conseil 
Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel is the authority responsible for the independence of the 
media; it controls respect for the legal framework and the protection of the viewers. It 
also supervises the quality and diversity of programs.  
In the case of Germany, the ALM (Allgemeine Landesmedienanstalten) is structured in 
much the same way as its Spanish counterpart, since a large proportion of its powers 
are attributed to sub-state entities (the regions in Spain, or the Länder in Germany). 
Thus, the creation and regulation of audiovisual authorities comes under the sphere of 
regional competences. Germany has a dual broadcasting system in which public and 
private stations coexist, quite similar to that of the United Kingdom. The 
Landesmedienanstalten are responsible for overseeing market entry and private 
broadcasting.  
The United Kingdom is one of the countries with the most extensive regulation of the 
audiovisual sector. It has two different control mechanisms, one for public 
broadcasting and on the other for private. The public sector is represented by the BBC, 
which functions in accordance with its legal status, and private broadcasting is 
regulated by OFCOM. OFCOM was established as a private body in a clear attempt to 
isolate it from governmental pressures. Market development, competitive strategies, 
audiovisual contents and broadcast standards are some of the aspects that come 
under the jurisdiction of this independent agency.  
Given this wide diversity of institutional solutions in different countries, informal fora 
have been created devoted to international cooperation. The three most important are 
the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities,4 the European Observatory of the 
                                                 
4
 .- cfr. www.epra.org  
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Audiovisual Sector,5 and the RIRM, the Mediterranean Network of Regulatory 
Authorities.6  
This brief overview underlines the great variety of institutional solutions regarding 
the administrative structures entrusted with audiovisual regulation, ranging from 
ministerial departments to specialised bodies. We should also distinguish between 
separate regulators and more general regulators that oversee telecommunications in 
general. From all these different institutional solutions, a common feature stands out: 
the need for independence from government structures.  
Spain has recently implemented a major reform of the legal framework of its 
audiovisual sector. The State Radio and Television Act of 2006 introduces some 
interesting novelties. Firstly, and most importantly, the Act puts an end to the classical 
notion of the audiovisual sector as a public service: it returns radio and television to 
the private sphere. The sector is now considered an economic service of general 
interest, with strong regulation and barriers to entry, and the public monopoly on 
broadcasting dating from 1980 is eliminated.  Under the 2006 Act, the legislator no 
longer considers the sector as being the responsibility of the State. The paradigm shift 
is so deep that the question is not just how an economic sector should be regulated, 
but whether it should in fact be under the sphere of public provision at all.  
The first point to note about the new administrative organisation of the public 
broadcasting company (Radio y Televisión Española, RTVE) is that its president will 
now be appointed by Parliament. The second important point is the legislative 
mandate for the creation of an Advisory Council. Certainly, when compared with the 
old model in which the president was named by the government, the new system 
reinforces independence. The president of the RTVE Corporation (now a state 
mercantile company with special autonomy, according to current legislation) is now 
appointed by a two-thirds parliamentary majority from among the 12 members of the 
Board of Directors of RTVE (eight elected by the Congress and four by the Senate: 
                                                 
5
 .- cfr. www.obs.coe.int  
6
 .- cfr. www.rirm.org  
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persons of recognised ability and professional experience and who appear before a 
parliamentary hearing to examine their suitability and also approved by a two-thirds 
parliamentary majority). All members serve a six-year term of office, and the grounds 
for their dismissal are also regulated.  
The system is therefore more independent, but in practice the management body of 
the public audiovisual corporation has become polarised. In addition, two recent 
RTVE presidents resigned before completing even half of their mandates. This creates 
an institutional impasse, and in fact the Parliament has not renewed half of the Board 
of Dirctors for more than a year after the end of their term. Therefore, the principles 
of independence and neutrality are far from being fulfilled.  
Together with these mechanisms to protect internal independence (the appointment 
of the president, the creation of the Advisory Council and the News Council), the 2006 
Act also entrusts the supervision of the public service’s fulfilment of its missions (art. 
40) to the audiovisual authority. But, when the 2006 Act was passed, this audiovisual 
authority had not even been constituted: the legislator conferred this important 
responsibility on a non-existent administrative body. It was not until the 2010 Act, 
passed in March of that year, that the regulator of the audiovisual sector listed in the 
table above, the Consejo Estatal de Medios Audiovisuales (CEMA – in English, the 
National Council of Audiovisual Media) came into being. 
Royal Decree 744/2004, of 23 April, created an Expert Committee for the reform of 
the public media. Among the several recommendations made by this Committee, the 
most important was the creation of an independent authority in the audiovisual 
sector. Some twenty years ago, Spain’s conservative party (the Partido Popular, or PP) 
presented a Parliamentary motion in order to create a National Media Council, which 
was passed by the Senate in 1995 but never implemented. The 2006 Act makes 
constant references to this unsuccessful motion and the 2009 Act compels the Cabinet 
to submit its draft of the General Communication Act within a year, since this 
authority has to fulfil the crucial mission of public service control.  
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Lastly, in its articles 44 and following, the 2010 General Audiovisual Communication 
Act regulates the CEMA, conceived as an independent regulator and ascribed to the 
Ministry of the Presidency. As an independent authority for the supervision and 
regulation of the public broadcasting company (note that its powers do not extend to 
the entire audiovisual sector), the CEMA’s mission is to uphold the independence and 
impartiality of State radio and television. The Council will be formed by the President 
and six counsellors7 appointed by the government by means of a Royal Decree, on the 
proposal of the Congress by a 3/5 majority from among persons of recognised 
competence and experience in matters related to the audiovisual sector. If the 
Congress does not reach the required majority within two months of the first voting, 
the  counsellors will be appointed by a simple majority vote. 
The internal structure of the CEMA also includes a Consultative Committee whose 
composition and rules of appointment will be determined in accordance with future 
regulations. The Council will submit an annual report to ParliamentParliament 
describing its activities and discussing the situation of the audiovisual market. The 
president of the CEMA will present the report to the competent Parliamentary 
commission. CEMA regulations and resolutions are subject to review before the 
ordinary courts.  
The shortcomings that this regulation presents are clear: there is no regulation of the 
president’s mandate or of his/her election. Nor is there any legal provision regarding 
his/her dismissal. All these elements are vital in order to guarantee the independence 
of the institution. But, leaving aside this poor legal regulation, the most flagrant failing 
is the fact that, seven years after the 2006 Act providing for the creation of this 
institution and more than three years after its effective regulation in the 2010 Act, the 
Spanish government has yet to appoint the president and counsellors.8 
                                                 
7 .- The original wording of the 2010 Act was amended by virtue of Additional Provision 41 of 2011 Sustainable 
Economy Act, which reduced the number of counsellors from seven to six. The casting vote of the president and 
the figure of vice-president have also disappeared. Thus, the CEMA now comprises seven members instead of 
nine.  
8  Its most recent efforts to do so are reflected in Ministerial Order PRE/1483/2011, of 3 June. The Order 
publishes the Cabinet Agreement to promote the effective creation of the CEMA. (Official State Gazette, 4 June 
2011). But this in fact constitutes no more than an appeal to respect legal provisions already in force. What is 
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To sum up, the situation in Spain panorama before the 2006 Act could hardly be said 
to fulfil the institutional and administrative criteria for protecting the freedom of 
expression and information. In 2006, mechanisms were established for the 
appointment by Parliament of the president of RTVE and for the creation of a News 
Council made up of professionals and thus not dependent on party politics. However, 
this system of internal guarantees has proved to be ineffective (both presidents 
resigned abruptly before completing their mandate), and the recent decision of the 
RTVE’s Board of Directors to adopt a rotating presidency imposes clear restrictions on 
its independence. The Spanish custom of applying political quotas to occupy the 
boards of independent institutions, and the refusal of the main political parties to 
renew certain posts, both bear witness to the urgent need to strengthen the 
administrative structures in order to meet the standards for protecting the 
independence of the public audiovisual sector. This grim panorama is rounded off by 
the fact that the launch of the CEMA is still pending. The 2006 Act provided for its 
creation as a high authority in the audiovisual sector but it was only with the passing 
of the 2010 Act (almost four years later) that it was effectively created and regulated, 
albeit with several grey areas regarding its legal definition and application. In fact, 
three years after its legal recognition, the members of the CEMA have not been 
appointed and needless to say, the council is yet to begin its work. 
In view of article 10 of the Convention,9 the European Court of Human Rights places a 
clear obligation on Member States a to provide an institutional setting able to protect 
the freedom of information and expression.10 To quote the ECHR itself: “Genuine, 
effective exercise of freedom of expression does not depend merely on the State's duty 
not to interfere, but may require it to take positive measures of protection, through its 
law or practice” (par. 99). These rights are not protected when a legal order has no 
effective “administrative infrastructure” to prevent current or potential interferences 
                                                                                                                                                     
more, the Order assigned provisional competences to both the Department for Telecommunications and the 
Information Society (SETSI) and the Telecommunications Market Commission (CMT).  
9 .- article 10.1. ECHR “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless 
of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises”.  
10.-  See ECHR judgement Manole v. Moldova  17 September 2009. (Application no. 13936/02).  
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with that fundamental right. It is no exaggeration to affirm that the Kingdom of Spain 
is close to breaching the international obligations imposed on it by the ECHR.  
We recognise that the European standard on independence of regulators is fixed by 
virtue of international law (the ECHR) and therefore lacks the primacy or 
harmonisation effect it would have under European Union Law. However, States must 
honour their international obligations, and all EU Member States are members of the 
ECHR. What is more, article 11 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
contains the same wording in relation to EU law and obligations.  
Sadly, the criticism voiced by Professor Bustamante in 2006 remains valid today: 
“Two challenges facing the Spanish democratic transition regarding the regulation of 
the media regulation remain unresolved 28 years after the writing of the Constitution: 
the establishment of an audiovisual public service worthy of the name, that is to say, 
with precise and distinct social missions and a truly democratic mode of operation, 
and the creation of an independent authority able to supervise its performance and to 
organise the audiovisual sector harmoniously in order to protect the interests of all 
citizens. The two shortcomings mentioned have the same cause: the instrumental, 
partisan conception of public broadcasting that has characterised all political parties 
in office, a clear throwback to the authoritarian origin of the structure of these media 
during Franco’s dictatorship. Both elements, in reality two complementary sides of the 
same process – the unfinished democratic transition – are now on the table.” 11 
2.2 The liberalisation of the Spanish Railway system 
In the railway sector we find a paradigmatic example of the application of new 
regulatory techniques to introduce competition and to encourage the entry of new 
operators in a State-run monopoly. The railway system is considered to be a natural 
monopoly, and so it is a candidate for unbundling: that is,  the separation of the 
management of the infrastructure from the provision of the service. In Spain, the 
management of the railway services is divided between ADIF, a State-owned company 
                                                 
11 BUSTAMANTE, E. “Un auténtico servicio público garantizado por el Consejo Audiovisual” Telos, nº 68. 
Julio-Septiembre 2006 
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responsible for infrastructure (track, signalling, and stations) and RENFE, formerly 
the monopoly holder and now solely responsible for passenger transport, in a market 
governed by freedom of access. Through this separation of responsibilities, 
competition can be introduced into a natural monopoly.  
In 1990 and 1994 the national railway network, RENFE, was restructured with the 
creation of separate bodies for infrastructure management and service exploitation. 
The Royal Decree of January 1994 amended RENFE’s legal charter. Legislation passed 
in 1996 created a public body for infrastructure management,12 and finally, the 
Railways Act of 2003 created the current legal framework for the sector, dividing its 
management between ADIF (infrastructures) and RENFE Operadora (service 
provision). The Act came into force on 31 December 2004.13 
The 2003 Railways Act contains separate provisions relating to infrastructures and 
services and marks the end of the traditional idea of joint exploitation. The two legal 
bodies, ADIF and RENFE Operadora, are both under the authority of the Transport 
Ministry (the Ministerio de Fomento). The Royal Decree of 30 December 2004 
approves the regulation of the industry and determines general principles for 
accessing the national railway network (the Red Nacional Integrada). Another Royal 
Decree of the same date establishes the legal regulation of ADIF, and on 16 February 
2007, the first contract between ADIF and Spanish government was signed to lay 
down the principles and goals of the network’s management.14 
ADIF adjudicates infrastructure capacities, and charges a fee for it. Significantly, in 
order to be able to provide railway services, an operator not only needs an 
administrative licence but must also have been awarded a contract for a transport 
connection between two points (origin and destination). The operator also has to 
                                                 
12 .- See SETUÁIN MENDÍA, B. La administración de infraestructuras en el derecho ferroviario español: el régimen jurídico del 
ADIF. Madrid, IUSTEL, 2009.  
13 .- Extension of “vacatio legis” by Royal Decree-Act of 7 May 2004. 
14 .- available at 
http://www.sff-cgt.org/juridica/legislacion_ferroviaria/ADIF_Contrato_Programa_2007_2010.pdf. Acceso 1 
junio 2013. Sse also the Resolution of 30 December 2009, de la Secretaría de Estado de Planificación e 
Infraestructuras, “por la que se encomienda al Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias la ejecución de 
inversiones contempladas en el Contrato-Programa Administración General del Estado-ADIF 2007-2010 en la 
Red Ferroviaria de Interés General de titularidad del Estado”. BOE 25 March 2010.  
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obtain a safety certificate. ADIF charges fees for the use of the network which are 
established by a Ministerial Order of 8 April 2005,  amended in 2012, as laid down in  
articles 74 and 75 of the 2003 Railways Act.15  
Both ADIF and RENFE Operadora are public companies  under the aegis  of the 
Transport Ministry (Ministerio de Fomento).16 The Ministry has the power to award 
administrative licences to operators and to fix the fees to be charged for the use of 
railway infrastructure. Inside this framework, we should analyse ADIF’s effective 
degree of autonomy in its two areas of activity. According to experts opinion, 
contracts will be awarded in accordance with the criteria previously established by 
Ministerial Order. In this respect, then, ADIF enjoys a very limited degree of 
autonomy. Article 81, section 1 of the 2003 Act also grants the Ministry the power to 
set the fees. This power was developed further in Ministerial Order 897/2005 which 
established “general price-setting principles”, which have been applied since that date.  
The 2003 Act also provides for the establishment of a Railway Regulation Committee 
(the Comité de Regulación Ferroviaria). European sectorial regulation foresees the 
creation of an independent regulator to oversee effective competition in the railway 
sector, particularly with regard to the fair and non-discriminatory assignment of 
contracts. This Committee is regulated in articles 82 and 83 of the 2003 Act. “The 
problem posed by the Committee’s absolute dependence on the Ministry lies not so 
much in its hierarchical submission to government but the fact that both public 
companies (ADIF and RENFE) operating in the sector are also under the umbrella of 
the Ministry. The potential efficacy of this body as a genuine regulator of a market that 
is now being opened up to competition has completely vanished.”17 
                                                 
15 .- BOE 1 November 2012 
16 .- In literature, the very fact that some administrative powers are entrusted to private businesses is questioned. 
See SETUÁIN MENDÍA, B. La administración de infraestructuras en el derecho ferroviario español: el régimen jurídico del 
ADIF. Madrid, IUSTEL, 2009. p. 131 ff.  
17 .- CARLON RUIZ, M. “El nuevo régimen jurídico del sector ferroviario: un tímido paso hacia la competencia” 
en Transportes y competencia : los procesos de liberalización de los transportes aéreo, marítimo y terrestre y la 
aplicación del derecho de la competencia en Fernández Farreres, G. (Coord), Madrid, Thomson Citivas 2004, p. 
412 
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The Spanish legal framework regarding the railway sector was further amended by 
the 2011 Sustainable Economy Act which, in its Final provision 4, foresaw the creation 
of a transport regulator. As of today, this body has not been established.18 Similarly, 
the status of the Railway Regulation Committee was reformulated in articles 82 and 
83.  
After an examination of these regulations, on 9 October 2009, the European 
Commission issued a letter of formal notice to the Kingdom of Spain for infringement 
of community law. Specifically, the Commission alleged that Spanish legislation does 
not comply with Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/14, in so far as the fees to be charged 
are set entirely by Ministerial Order, with the result that the only function allocated to 
the infrastructure manager, namely ADIF, is the levying of the said fees. Indeed, ADIF 
does no more than calculate the fee in each particular case, applying a formula 
established in advance and in detail by the ministerial authorities. As a result, it has no 
power to adjust the amount in any individual case. 
The wording of the Directive provision is very clear:  
Article 4. 1. Member States shall establish a charging framework while 
respecting the management independence laid down in Article 4 of Directive 
91/440/EEC. Subject to the said condition of management independence, 
Member States shall also establish specific charging rules or delegate such 
powers to the infrastructure manager. The determination of the charge for the 
use of infrastructure and the collection of this charge shall be performed by the 
infrastructure manager. 
Article 4.2. Where the infrastructure manager, in its legal form, organisation or 
decision-making functions, is not independent of any railway undertaking, the 
functions, described in this chapter, other than collecting the charges shall be 
                                                 
18 .- Additional Provision 4: “El Gobierno, cuando así lo aconsejen las condiciones de competencia en los 
mercados de transporte, y, en particular, los avances en el proceso de liberalización del sector ferroviario, remitirá 
al Parlamento un proyecto de Ley de creación de un organismo regulador del sector transporte, que integre las 
funciones atribuidas al Comité de Regulación Ferroviaria y la regulación del resto de modos de transporte.” When 
the legislation regarding the creation of the National Commission on Markets and Competition is finally passed, 
the Railway Regulation Committee will be part of this new macro-regulator.  
 16 
performed by a charging body that is independent in its legal form, 
organisation and decision-making from any railway undertaking.” 
According to the Commission, the Spanish legislation in question also fails to comply 
with the requirement relating to the management autonomy of the railway 
infrastructure manager, since, by entrusting the task of setting the fees exclusively to 
the ministerial authorities, it deprives the infrastructure manager of an essential 
management tool.  
The case ended before the ECJ (As C-483/10. Judgement of 28 February 2013), 
which ruled that: “under the Spanish legislation at issue, it is the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Transport which acts as the regulatory body. While it is true that 
Article 30(1) of Directive 2001/14 provides that the ministry responsible for 
transport matters may be designated as the regulatory body, that provision 
nevertheless requires that body to be independent of the charging body. That ministry 
cannot therefore be regarded as fulfilling its regulatory function in accordance with 
that provision if, at the same time as it performs its regulatory role, it also determines 
the amount to be charged. It follows that, in order to ensure that the objective of 
management independence of the infrastructure manager is fulfilled, the latter must, 
within the charging framework established by the Member States, be given a degree of 
flexibility in determining the amount of charges so as to enable it to use that flexibility 
as a management tool. 
In the present case, it is apparent from the file before the Court that the ADIF does not 
enjoy the management independence necessary for the exercise of its powers, since 
those powers are confined to establishing the specific charge in each individual case 
by applying a formula laid down in advance by ministerial order. It must therefore be 
concluded that, in that regard, the Spanish legislation in question does not comply 
with Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/14.” 19  
                                                 
19 .- par. 48 to 50 of the ECJ judgement.  
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In fact, the infringement declaration is not exclusive to Spain: the railway 
liberalisation process has experienced similar difficulties in many European 
countries.20 
Similarly, the Communication from the Commission concerning the development 
of a Single European Railway Area (2010)21, also identified the lack of 
independence of regulatory bodies as a major obstacle in the liberalisation process. 
“Member States’ regulatory bodies encounter difficulties in carrying out their 
supervision duties over infrastructure managers, in particular to ensure no 
discrimination against new entrants and to check whether charging principles and 
accounting separation are properly applied. These difficulties are often due to a lack of 
staff and other resources, and may be compounded in cases where the regulatory 
body does not have sufficient independence from the infrastructure managers, 
incumbent rail undertaking or the ministry which exerts ownership rights over the 
incumbent operator. The regulation on a rail network for competitive freight requires 
closer cooperation between infrastructure managers along the national sections of 
European corridors; this in turn requires parallel closer cooperation between the 
corresponding national regulators. The experience to be gathered here may be useful 
should the Commission later consider taking a more integrated approach to market 
supervision in the single European railway area. Existing legislation already goes 
some way to dealing with these issues. But the Commission is aware that problems 
will persist if the EU regulatory framework is not properly implemented. This is why 
the Commission has already taken the initiative in launching infringement procedures 
against Member States who fail to apply EU law properly.”22 
The European Parliament is currently working on the amendment of the railway 
Directive 2012/34/EU. According to the new text, “(9) The existing requirements for 
                                                 
20 .- Portugal. case C- 557/10. ECJ Judgement of 25/10/2012; Greece. case C-528/10. ECJ Judgement of 
8/11/2012; Austria. case C-555/10. ECJ Judgement of 28/02/2013; Germany. case C-556/10. ECJ Judgement of 
28/02/2013; Hungary. case C-473/10. ECJ Judgement of 28/02/2013; France. case C-625/10 ECJ Judgement of 
18/04/2013; Poland. case C-512/10 ECJ Judgement of 30/05/2013, Czech Republic. Case C 545/10. ECJ 
Judgement of 11/07/2013; Slovenia. Case C-627/10 ECJ Judgement of 11/07/2013: Italy. case C-369/11 ECJ 
Judgement of 3/10/2913 and Luxembourg. case C-412/11 ECJ Judgement of 11/07/2013. 
21 .- COM (2010) 474 final. Brussels 17tSeptember 2010.  
22 .- ibidem 
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the independence of infrastructure managers from railway transport undertakings, as 
laid down in Directive 2012/34/EU, only cover the essential functions of the 
infrastructure manager, which are the decision-making on train path allocation, and 
the decision-making on infrastructure charging. It is however necessary that all the 
functions are exercised in an independent way, since other functions may equally be 
used to discriminate against competitors. This is in particular true for decisions on 
investments or on maintenance which may be made to favour the parts of the network 
which are mainly used by the transport operators of the integrated undertaking. 
Decisions on the planning of maintenance works may influence the availability of train 
paths for the competitors. 
(10) The existing requirements of Directive 2012/34/EU only include legal, 
organisational and decision-making independence. This does not entirely exclude the 
possibility of maintaining an integrated undertaking, as long as these three categories 
of independence are ensured. Concerning the decision-making independence it must 
be ensured that the appropriate safeguards exclude control of an integrated 
undertaking over the decision-making of an infrastructure manager. However, even 
the full application of such safeguards does not completely remove all the possibilities 
for discriminatory behaviour towards competitors which exist in the presence of a 
vertically integrated undertaking. In particular, the potential for cross-subsidisation 
still exists in integrated structures, or at least it is very difficult for regulatory bodies 
to control and enforce safeguards which are established to prevent such cross-
subsidisation. An institutional separation of infrastructure management and transport 
operation is the most effective measure to solve these problems. 
(11) Member States should therefore be required to ensure that the same legal or 
natural person or persons are not entitled to exercise control over an infrastructure 
manager and, at the same time, exercise control or any right over a railway 
undertaking. Conversely, control over a railway undertaking should preclude the 
possibility of exercising control or any right over an infrastructure manager. 
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(12) Where Member States still maintain an infrastructure manager which is part of a 
vertically integrated undertaking, they should at least introduce strict safeguards to 
guarantee effective independence of the entire infrastructure manager in relation to 
the integrated undertaking. These safeguards should not only concern the corporate 
organisation of the infrastructure manager in relation to the integrated undertaking, 
but also the management structure of the infrastructure manager, and, as far as 
possible within an integrated structure, prevent financial transfers between the 
infrastructure manager and the other legal entities of the integrated undertaking. (...) 
”23  
2.3 Electronic Communications and the new Spanish Competition Authority 
EU Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 
2002 on the common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services (Framework Directive), and in particular, article 3, par. 2 and 3, imposes 
on Member States the requirement that their national regulatory authorities be 
independent, in the following terms:  
“2. Member States shall guarantee the independence of national regulatory 
authorities by ensuring that they are legally distinct from and functionally 
independent of all organisations providing electronic communications 
networks, equipment or services. Member States that retain ownership or 
control of undertakings providing electronic communications networks and/or 
services shall ensure effective structural separation of the regulatory function 
from activities associated with ownership or control. 
3. Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities exercise 
their powers impartially and transparently.” 
 
                                                 
23 .- Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2012/34/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area, as 
regards the opening of the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail and the governance of the 
railway infrastructure. Brussels 30 Jan 2013. COM (2013) 29 final.  
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These provisions are explained in point 11 of the Preamble: “In accordance with the 
principle of the separation of regulatory and operational functions, Member States 
should guarantee the independence of the national regulatory authority or authorities 
with a view to ensuring the impartiality of their decisions. This requirement of 
independence is without prejudice to the institutional autonomy and constitutional 
obligations of the Member States or to the principle of neutrality with regard to the 
rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership laid down in 
Article 295 of the Treaty. National regulatory authorities should be in possession of all 
the necessary resources, in terms of staffing, expertise, and financial means, for the 
performance of their tasks.”  
Moreover, the NRA must exercise its powers in accordance with the principles of 
transparency and impartiality. In 2008, the European Commission initiated an 
infringement procedure against Poland. The Commission argued that Poland did not 
fulfil European law since its national legislation did not establish the duration of the 
mandate of its NRA or a list of grounds for dismissal of its members, and that it left 
these matters to the discretion of the Prime Minister. Nor was there any effective 
guarantee that economic operators in which the State was a stakeholder would be 
treated on an equal footing with other competitors. Poland agreed to amend its 
legislation, and the case was then closed.24 
In Spain, electronic communications are under the supervisory powers of the 
Comisión del Mercado de Telecomunicaciones (CMT), the Spanish regulatory agency for 
the sector. However, the initial wording of Bill 3/2013 proposed to return those 
functions to the government, specifically to the Ministry of Industry. This crucial 
reform was given no explicit justification, nor was any kind of explanation offered in 
the Bill’s legal provisions.  
The Spanish NRAs in the fields of telecommunications and energy (CMT and CNE) 
were extremely critical of the planned reform. This process, in which the 
responsibility for regulation is returned to the government, is unparalleled in Europe. 
                                                 
24 .- ECJ Order of 17 September 2009. Case C-309/08.  
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The document “Informe sobre el Anteproyecto de Ley de creación de la Comisión 
Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia” (MTZ 2012/398) issued by the Comisión 
del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones25 contains a comparative table summarising 
the different powers of telecommunications NRAs in several European countries. 
 
 
 
The table clearly shows that the Spanish regulator lacks most of the powers other 
European NRAs enjoy. Now, with the reform, the Spanish NRA will have no 
jurisdiction with regard to numbering, recording operators, resolution of conflicts 
between operators, data protection, or competences regarding the definition and 
supervision of universal service obligations. So the position of the recently created 
Comision Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC: in English, the National 
Commission for Markets and Competition) is a far cry from that of the 
Bundesnetzagentur in Germany or OFCOM in Britain.  
In fact, the reform of the Spanish regulatory system will leave the new creation, the 
CNMC, with very limited powers in the field of telecommunications. “The Ministry of 
Industry has deprived the organism that will substitute the CMT of basic areas of 
jurisdiction  such as telephone number portability, numbering, operator registration, 
universal service and conflict resolution between operators. The telecommunications 
                                                 
25 .- Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones (CMT) “Informe sobre el Anteproyecto de Ley de creación 
de la Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia” (MTZ 2012/398) 15 March 2012.  
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sector has judged the reform inappropriate. The spirit of the reform bows to the 
demands of the three companies with the largest infrastructures (Telefonica, 
Vodafone and ONO) which have always complained about CMT’s interventionism 
favouring small operators. The only relevant power that the CMT (now a section of the 
CNMC) will retain is that of market analysis.”26  
To quote Professors Ariño and De la Cuétara, “the proposed reform, in its current 
state, transforms the existing NRA into a huge supervisory body which loses many of 
its active powers to the Ministries, as the National Energy Commission (the CNE) has 
already energetically pointed out. Competition policy can work without these powers 
but regulation cannot. With the transferred powers, it will be the Ministry of Industry 
and the Ministries of Transport and Telecommunications (Fomento) that will take 
regulatory decisions, but one of the basic characteristics of an NRA will have been lost: 
its independence. This is exactly the opposite of what is expressed in the Bill’s 
preamble and the opposite of what PP and PSOE proposed in their respective electoral 
programs. This cannot work. If we analyse the issue of portability, the new Bill 
considers it as a mere register which can be managed by ordinary civil servants who 
will record the changes. However, if the matter were so simple, the problems with 
number portability would have disappeared a long time ago, and this is far from being 
the case. The right of users to preserve their own number when changing operator is a 
basic competitive need and without it, the number of changes will be strongly 
reduced. Inevitably, big operators try to make these changes difficult in order to not to 
lose customers. As anyone can see, this is no ordinary register: it implies the 
interconnection of operators’ telematic centres with the regulator, and with their 
billing services in such a way that a customer is assured that the change of operator 
will be cleared in 24 hours. The point at issue here is regulation, and not simply 
administrative management: sectorial regulation and not competition policy, even 
                                                 
26 .- “La CMT y la CNE se rebelan contra el plan del Gobierno de quitarles poder” El País, 20 March 2012 
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though the goal is the same: to raise competition to increase sector efficiency and 
dynamism”27  
The reform embarked upon by the Spanish legal order in this field was of such a scale 
that new allocation powers in electronic communications might contravene European 
law. Although the 2103 bill claims to be based on European models, the fact is that the 
Vice-President of the European Commission, Neelie Kroes, expressed her doubts 
regarding the compatibility of this new institutional setting with European law.28 The 
bill was finally amended and the final version does not include the devolution of 
regulatory powers to the government.  
In fact, the question of competences not only aroused concern at the European 
Commission but was also analysed by the European Court of Justice itself. In its 
Judgement of 3 December 2009 (Commission c. Germany. Case C-424/07), the 
Court deals with the compatibility of German law with EU law in relation to the 
“deprivation of competences” of the NRA in the issue of new telecommunications 
markets. More precisely, by virtue of the Telekommunikationsgesetz, the German NRA 
is not allowed to promote competition in new optical fibre markets, since the German 
legislator considers that these new markets should be protected from competition in 
order to guarantee effective infrastructure investment and to support innovation. The 
legal debate is very complex, but what is relevant to our study is the final result: in 
spite of the existence of a principle of non-regulation for new markets – as a general 
rule, new markets should not be subject to ex-ante regulation – the German legislator 
cannot prevent the NRA from determining the need for regulation of those markets. 
The electronic communications Framework Directive confers on the NRA, and not on 
the national legislature, the task of determining the need for regulation of new 
                                                 
27 .- ARIÑO ORTIZ, G. & DE LA CUÉTARA, J.M. “Reguladores sectoriales y defensa de la competencia. Una 
aportación al debate de su fusión” Ariño & Villar WP nº 42, 2012, p. 25-26. 
28 .- “legislation currently being considered in Spain seems to undermine the independence of the NRA and also 
planning a major transfer of powers normally exercised by independent NRA to the executive power. From our 
point of view, it is difficult to understand how such a comprehensive transfer of powers from the independent 
NRA to ministerial authorities could be compatible with the objectives, principles and obligations of the EU 
regulatory framework” Letter from the Vice-president of the European Commission to Don José Manuel Soria 
Lopez, Minister of Industry, Energy and Tourism. 11 February 2013 
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markets. On this point, the Telekommunikationsgesetz fails to fulfil Germany’s 
obligations under EU law.  
 The opinion expressed by Advocate-General Miguel Poiares Maduro explains in detail 
the grounds of the ECJ judgement in defining the powers of national regulatory 
authorities:  
“(...) intervention in privately-owned facilities will reduce the incentives to develop 
these facilities in the first place. That is why, under Article 82 EC, ordering the 
compulsory access to a facility (as a remedy for an abusive refusal to supply) will be 
appropriate only if the strictest requirements are met. That is also why, under 
Community regulation of the telecommunications sector, imposing an obligation to 
enter into negotiations to grant access must be proportional and truly required by the 
competitive situation. Therefore, it can be established that the possibilities of 
intervention that regulation entails will reduce incentives to invest in infrastructure 
and innovation. (15) As such, it is only natural that the incumbent 
telecommunications operator does not view regulation kindly; and if Germany wishes 
to promote investment in telecommunications infrastructure, it would do well to 
address those concerns. It would come down to a policy choice: to restrain regulation, 
and suffer the associated effects of substantive market power, in order to favour 
investment in infrastructure. 
In normal circumstances, Germany would be allowed to make such a policy choice; 
but not when there is Community regulation of the telecommunications sector. Here, 
the choice has already been made by the Community legislature to submit this sector 
to regulation, with all the possibilities for intervention that it entails.”29 
After establishing the tension between the principles of competition and regulation, 
the Advocate-General goes on to discuss the powers of the NRA:  
“For Germany, the objectives of the Community regulatory framework can be 
balanced in different ways, and what its legislature did was to ‘instruct’ the German 
NRA on how to perform this balancing, giving priority to one particular objective. 
                                                 
29
 .- Advocate General Opinion, 23 April 2009. Case C-424/07. par. 51 to 53.  
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Germany argues that such instructions are within the margin of appreciation allowed 
in transposing the Community regulatory framework. The issue, therefore, is to whom 
the Community regulatory framework assigns the balancing of its different objectives: 
to the national legislature, in transposing that framework, or to NRAs, in their specific 
assessments? I must stress that the answer is independent of the particular objective 
pursued. It may turn out that Germany is correct, and special attention needs to be 
given, as regards new markets, to incentives to infrastructure and innovation. 
However, assigning such balancing to the national legislature has different 
consequences from assigning it to the NRAs. NRAs have been set up and given 
particular powers by the Community regulatory framework for a reason: they are 
expected to be insulated from certain interests and to reach their decisions governed 
only by the criteria established in that framework. 
As such, I believe that the balancing of the regulatory framework's objectives lies with 
the NRAs. Article 8 of the Framework Directive expressly assigns the pursuit of these 
objectives – and therefore their balancing – to NRAs, not to the national legislature. 
This creates an institutional arrangement whereby the task of the national legislature 
is limited to ensuring that NRAs take all necessary measures to pursue those 
objectives, as the Court has confirmed on several occasions. Even the autonomy of the 
Member States as regards the organisation and structuring of the NRAs has been 
subordinated to this pursuit. This also presupposes that it is NRAs, faced with specific 
assessments, which are better placed to decide how those different objectives are to 
be balanced in order to maximise them. In other words, a decision by a national 
legislature to give priority to one particular objective would, in fact, affect the way in 
which the Community legislature intended the specific market assessments to be 
made: by the NRAs, taking into account the different objectives on a case-by-case 
basis. The absence of a system attributing priority as between the objectives laid 
down in the Community regulatory framework, and the consequent discretion 
granted to the NRAs, was therefore fully intentional on the part of the Community 
legislature. 
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Thus, Germany cannot limit the discretion of the German NRA regarding intervention 
in new markets by subjecting it to conditions, such as those laid down in Paragraph 
9a(2) of the TKG, which give priority to one particular regulatory objective.”30  
The ECJ upholds the Opinion of the Advocate-General and declares that “by adopting 
Paragraph 9a of the Law on Telecommunications (Telekommunikationsgesetz), of 22 
June 2004, the Federal Republic of Germany has failed to fulfil its obligations under 
Article 8(4) of Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications 
networks and associated facilities (Access Directive), Articles 6 to 8(1) and (2), 15(3) 
and 16 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 
March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services (Framework Directive), and Article 17(2) of Directive 
2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on 
universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks 
and services (Universal Service Directive)”.  
We thus confirm a kind of reservation of regulatory powers in favour of independent 
authorities at the expense of the national legislator. This finding should be taken into 
account as regards the new allocations of powers proposed by Act 3/2013 in the field 
of electronic communications. In Professor Fernando’s opinion: “the ECJ judgement 
reinforces the discretionality that is characteristic of NRAs, at least in those fields 
where they enforce EU law. As in the previous case of Poland, this declaration implies 
that the regulatory options granted to NRAs by virtue of EU law can be restricted, 
interfered or even eliminated by the national legislator. Not even under the allegation 
of a greater legal certainty or a better judicial control can such an intervention be 
justified.”31  
                                                 
30 .- Opinion of the Advocate-General. Delivered on 23 April 2009. Case C-424/07. par 62 to 67.  
31 .- FERNANDO PABLO, M.M. “”El Legislador nacional no puede eliminar o limitar el ámbito discrecional 
concedido a una Autoridad Nacional de Regulación por el derecho comunitario” in GARCÍA DE ENTERRÍA, 
E. & ALONSO GARCÍA, E. (Coords). Administración y Justícia: un análisis jurisprudencial. Liber Amicorum al Profesor 
T.R. Fernandez Rodriguez. Civitas, Madrid, 2012 
 27 
To conclude, in the field of telecommunications and electronic communications, the 
devolution of powers from independent authorities to the government may well clash 
with the European regulatory framework.  
3. Legal implications 
3.1 The limits of the democratic legitimacy of government and the conflict 
between independent agencies and the Spanish Constitution 
According to the conventional wisdom taught in Law Schools, the legitimacy of  public 
administration is derived. Citizens vote in general elections to elect their 
representatives who sit in the legislative chambers – in Spain, the Congress and the 
Senate. The first task that the elected Chambers must perform is to appoint a 
President and a Cabinet. The government directs public administrations and executes 
budgetary provisions to develop public policies This paradigm is also reflected in the 
Spanish constitution of 1978. Article 97 states that: “The Government shall conduct 
domestic and foreign policy, civil and military administration and the defence of the 
State. It exercises executive authority and the power of statutory regulations in 
accordance with the Constitution and the laws.”  
According to this model, public administration is based on a hierarchical structure, in 
which different jurisdictions are assigned to different Departments or Ministries, all  
under the political leadership of the President or Prime Minister. However, after the 
leading case of Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869, 79 L. 
Ed. 1611 (1935), it was established that the president could not remove a 
commissioner at will (in this case, the head of the Federal Trade Commission, FTC) 
without cause. The statute that created the commission permitted dismissal of the 
commissioner only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or official misconduct. President 
Roosevelt wished to replace FTC Commissioner William E. Humphrey, who had been 
nominated by his predecessor President Hoover for a seven-year term in 1931, with 
someone of his own choice. The Court held that because Humphrey was not an 
executive officer, the president could not remove him from office except for the causes 
set forth in the statute. Since then, public officials and civil servants have had to accept 
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administrative agencies as a new element of contemporary government, although the 
nature and scope of agency powers remains controversial. This is especially true of 
independent agencies, which comprise what is known as the “headless fourth branch 
of government”. 
The birth of independent agencies – that is, independent from political supervision – 
constitutes a deviation from the traditional form of understanding public 
administration. The legitimacy of an independent authority, body, commission or 
agency lies not in the fact that it has been elected by Parliament but in its specialised 
competence, impartiality, neutrality and expertise. This is not the place to deal in 
depth with the justifications for the creation of an agency; we would merely stress 
that EU law poses a constant challenge to traditional forms of administrative 
legitimacy.  
National regulatory authorities are accountable to Parliament, and their activity is 
reviewed by the courts. However, their source of legitimacy is not political. Quite the 
opposite: NRAs are called to exercise their powers – some of them of huge social 
consequence – in accordance with the principles of neutrality, transparency, and 
effectiveness. European Law is exporting this model of enforcing public policy in a 
way that strongly resembles the role of the European Commission itself.  
3.2 The false institutional autonomy of Member States  
As we noted in the above section, conventional wisdom holds that Member States 
enjoy full discretion with regard to the implementation of European law at domestic 
level. The EU has no say in the choice of the national institution or level of government 
responsible for enforcing European law; nor does it stipulate the legal instruments to 
be used, provided that full respect of EU law is granted (the effet utile theory). 
Therefore, States enjoy institutional and legal autonomy in the implementation and 
enforcement of EU law.  
Nevertheless, the economic freedoms enshrined in the EU Treaties imply a certain 
degree of economic liberalisation. Formally, EU law exhibits full deference to the 
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national legal systems with regard to the organisation and provision of the old public 
services, but experience shows that State monopolies are subject to European 
competition law. Since the Corbeau and Almelo rulings, States have had to justify that 
exceptions to free market are the only way of ensuring that a service is provided and 
that the public interest is satisfied. In turn, this implies that legal monopoly cannot be 
the sole mode of provision in any economic sector.  
The combination of these two aspects (economic liberalisation and administrative 
organisation) leads to the emergence of new regulatory techniques. Now, 
telecommunications, transportation and energy are defined as services of general 
economic interest. The principles of separation of infrastructure and service 
provision, third party access, transparent funding and universal service have made 
their way into our legal vocabulary. When a monopoly is liberalised through 
unbundling, a new administrative regime is required.  
It is true that art. 345 TFEU states the neutrality of EU law in respect of the property 
of States: “The Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States 
governing the system of property ownership”. Therefore, a Member State has no 
obligation to privatise (by selling the assets of its public firms). But in the new 
economic scenario, an incumbent may very well demand the existence of an 
independent administration to guarantee equal non-discriminatory treatment in 
relation to market access or infrastructure use.  
It is also true that article 35 of EU Regulation 1/2003 provides that Member States 
shall freely designate national competition authorities as long as that the provisions of 
European competition law are effectively complied with. However, recent ECJ 
judgements32 have had a clear impact on national procedural rules, and may 
compromise the effectiveness of arts. 101 and 102 of the TFEU.  
In conclusion, an invisible requirement of EU law is the transformation of national 
administration from a hierarchical, politically-sanctioned structure to an independent 
                                                 
32 .- see ECJ Judgement of 7 December 2010. Vlaamse federatie van verenigingen van Brood- en Banketbakkers, 
Ijsbereiders en Chocoladebewerkers (VEBIC) VZW. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Hof van Beroep te 
Brussel – Belgium. Case C-439/08.  
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model capable of overseeing a new economic scenario without political interference 
or without the temptation of privileging old public companies now operating under 
market conditions.  
3.3 A final note on the new Spanish Competition Authority 
The Spanish Parliament has just passed Act 3/2013, of 4 June, which creates the 
National Commission for Markets and Competition (CNMC). This new Commission 
brings both competition and the regulation of individual sectors (Energy, 
Telecommunications, Transportation and Audiovisuals) under a sole institution. The 
aim for this major reform is to obtain administrative savings by reducing areas of 
overlap, and at the same time to achieve notable improvements in efficiency and legal 
certainty.  
Even though this National Commission has been presented as a rationalising measure, 
it contains several elements that point in a different direction.  
In the first place, although competition and regulation are closely related elements 
which interact in a particular sector, it is by no means clear that both should be under 
the same institutional setting. In fact, elsewhere in Europe only the Netherlands has 
also adopted this approach. While competition is designed to discipline illegal conduct 
(i.e., as a reactive instrument), regulation focuses more on fixing the market 
conditions (i.e., as a preventive instrument). Market entry can be used as a regulatory 
tool, but also impacts on relevant market structures and competition. In order to 
avoid these potential conflicts, the National Commission divides itself into two 
sections: a competition chamber, and a regulation chamber. The nine counsellors of 
the new institution  rotate between the two sections during their mandate. In case of 
disagreement, the plenary of the CNMC will decide. Therefore, in its own internal 
structure, the CNMC reproduces the duality it is supposed to avoid.  
Secondly, the huge number of cases the CNMC will have to deal with are entrusted to 
only nine counsellors and the president. This means that the institution will lose 
specialisation and expertise: nobody is capable of adjudicating on very complex issues 
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such as market dominance in telecommunications, price formation in energy, and 
infrastructure use in transportation. What is more, the nine recently appointed 
counsellors have a political background and none of them can be considered as having 
sectorial competence. This means that decisions will be taken by administrative staff 
rather than by counsellors, and there is no specific requirement of independence for 
staff serving in the CNMC.  
The real power of the institution, then, moves from the General Council to Directorate 
Generals, as the organisational chart below shows. Even more worryingly, in this 
process of bureaucratisation some independent authorities are reduced to mere 
administrative units. The authority for audiovisuals and media, for example, is now 
merely a section inside the Directorate General of Telecommunications.  
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Finally, when Spain’s conservative party (the PP) won the general elections in 
Novenber 2011, it faced a difficult scenario with regard to the independent regulators. 
The PP obtained a large Parliamentary majority, gaining control of 15 out of 17 
regional governments and most of the country’s leading municipalities. Prior to the 
elections, however, Bernardo Lorenzo Almedros had been appointed President of the 
Telecommunications Commission, on 10 May 2011; Alberto Lafuente Félez had been 
appointed President of the energy regulator on 15 June 2011, and finally, Joaquín 
García Bernaldo de Quirós had been designated President of the Competition 
Commission on 14 October 2011. The presidents of these three NRAs, appointed 
under the outgoing Socialist government, all had a six-year mandate and were to hold 
office until 2017. The new Cabinet now faced very important and sensitive cases 
under the legal mandate of those three presidents, without the possibility of changing 
them before 2017.  
In the past, changes in the legal regulation of NRAs had been solved by maintaining 
the appointed presidents in office till the expiration of their mandate. In this case, the 
creation of the new CNMC led to the automatic dismissal of all three presidents and 
the appointment of new members. To put it bluntly, what an administrative reform 
could not achieve (i.e., the dismissal of NRA members at the will of the government) is 
now accomplished by a legislative act. The 2013 Act will both amend the legal nature 
of NRAs and allow the removal of their directors. In this way, administrative 
independence becomes contingent on legislative reform.  
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